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Abstract
Software defined networking allows the separation of the control plane and data plane in
networking. It provides scalability, programmability, and centralized control. It will use these
traits to reach ubiquitous connectivity. Like all concepts software defined networking does not
offer these advantages without a cost. By utilizing a centralized controller, a single point of
failure is created. To address this issue, this paper proposes a distributed controller failover. This
failover will provide a mechanism for recovery when controllers are not located in the same
location. This failover mechanism is based on number of hops from orphan nodes to the
controller in addition to the link connection. This mechanism was simulated in Long Term
Evolution telecommunications architecture.
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Acronyms
E-UTRA

Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunication System Terrestrial Radio
Access

EPC

Evolved Packet Core

HLF

Hop and Link Failover

LTE

Long Term Evolution

ms

milliseconds

Mbps

megabits per second

SDN

Software Defined Networking

1 Introduction
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an enabling technology to overcome growing
data traffic in dense heterogeneous networks. SDN provides an agile and flexible network. It
decouples the control plane from the data plane to create a programmable and centralized
software. It allows for scalability and management of a network.
SDN can assume two different architectures. The first assumes a centralized controller
over a network. Controllers can be responsible for nodes or other controllers. The second
architecture assumes a distributed system of controllers. In either case SDN still maintains the
same weakness, a single point of failure. At any time controller failure can transpire. Failure can
occur from various events including power outages or lack of connectivity. Once failure
transpires, nodes become orphans. They will be unable to transfer data to new connections
without a controller. This paper will address the detection of failure and recovery in the
distributed architecture.
Failure analysis is an important concept in understanding how and why failure is
occurring. Analysis helps to determine the methods for failover. By understanding failure, one
can prevent of false positives and determine if failover is truly necessary. Failure analysis is
broken into failure types and failure detection.
In order to recover from controller failure, a mechanism must be created to enable orphan
nodes to be connected to other controllers. Failover must react instantaneously to maintain
network connectivity in a quick efficient manner. Recovery strategies have been researched and
are broken into redundant controllers and non-redundant controllers.
This paper proposes a Hop and Link Failover (HLF) mechanism for recovery due to a
controller failure. This mechanism was simulated in a Long Term Evolution (LTE) environment
to prove efficient failover. The LTE environment was chosen as it is predicted to use SDN in 5G
technology. 5G LTE is the next generation of telecommunications that will enable more devices
on the network. This is necessary because there is expected to be 50 billion Internet-of-Things
devices by 2020 [1].
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Section 2 presents background
concepts of the SDN paradigm, the SDN architecture in a distributed manner, analysis of failure
types and detection of controllers, and various strategies for failover. Section 3 presents related
works in failover and recovery. Section 4 introduces the HLF mechanism. Section 5 discusses
the setup and performance of HLF simulation. Finally the paper is concluded in Section 6.
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2 Background
The following sections describe the concepts of SDN and how it incorporates into a
distributed architecture. This description is followed by the analysis of failure types and
detection of controllers. Lastly various strategies for failover are discussed.

2.1 Software Defined Networking
Software Defined Networking is a new technology for managing networks. Originally it
was thought of as centralized control with an OpenFlow protocol for communications between
the control plane and the data plane. Its definition has now changed and can be defined by three
features. It is abstracted from the hardware thus having no dependency on physical hardware
restrictions. It maintains centralized control to manage forwarding tables and policy
delegation. It is programmable to dynamically configure networks based on policy and demand
[2].
The SDN architecture consists of three planes and two interfaces for communication
between the planes. The components include the application plane, the control plane, and the
data plane. The two interfaces include the northbound and southbound interfaces [3]. The SDN
architecture is shown in Figure 1.
The data layer is the bottom most layer of the SDN architecture. It consists of network
devices that forwards data based on control tables. Although the data layer contains control
tables it does not create the table. The table comes from the controller.
The southbound interface is used for communication between the data layer and the
control layer. This interface is used to transmit the type and amount of traffic from the data layer
to the control layer. It is also used to transmit the flow tables from the controller to the data layer.
The controller layer is in charge of enforcing policies from the business applications. It
creates forwarding tables and prioritizes quality of service based on business policies. The
control layer sends forwarding tables to the data layer.
The northbound interface is used for communication between the controller layer and the
application layer. It provides abstract network views and enables network requirements. This
interface can be implemented through an application protocol interface.
The application layer is the top most layer of the SDN architecture. It consists of business
applications. These applications programmatically communicate business policies to the
network. They determine quality of service and network behavior through service level
agreements.
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Figure 1: Traditional Network vs. SDN [4]

SDN can improve network communication. It brings new features to networking such as
performance, virtualization, orchestration, programmability, visibility, and dynamic scaling.
SDN improves performance by managing bandwidth and adjusting the traffic loads. It can be
optimized for network capacity and adjust for node failure. It has the ability to orchestrate traffic
for a plethora of devices with a few commands. SDN creates visibility in software to monitor
resources. SDN is virtualized. It uses network resources regardless of physical location and can
dynamically scale according to its need.

2.2 Distributed SDN Architecture
SDN can be incorporated in a distributed fashion. This architecture consists of multiple
SDN controllers. Each SDN controller is responsible for one sub-network of nodes. These nodes
are network devices such as switches or eNodeBs that deliver packets from devices to other
devices. The controllers can communicate with one another in a distributed fashion. An example
architecture is shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Distributed SDN Controllers

The advantage of a distributed SDN architecture is that it enables reliability in the network by
eliminating a single point of failure. It allows other controllers to adopt orphan nodes during
controller failure. The distributed architecture allows each network to be dynamically
configured.

2.3 Long Term Evolution Architecture
Long Term Evolution is a communications standard for telecommunications. It is located
in the access portion of the Evolved Packet System to transmit data. LTE uses an architecture
where the user equipment communicates with the Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunication
System Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) [5]. The E-UTRA then transmits data to the Evolved
Packet Core (EPC) in order to communicate with the Internet. Figure 3 shows the architecture.

Figure 3: Telecommunications Architecture [6]

User equipment includes items such as computers, mobile phone, tablets, and Internet-ofThings devices. It consists of devices that start the initial transmittal of data. User equipment
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transmits data through radio waves to towers. These towers are known as eNodeBs. The
ENodeBs communicate with one another as well as the EPC.
The EPC is the core network for LTE communications. It is a framework that provides
data on an IP network. The EPC consists of five major components: mobility management entity,
serving gateway, packet data network gateway, the home subscriber server, and the policy
control and charging rules function. These components hold user information, policy, and
charging rules. It also allows user equipment to access the Internet.

2.4 SDN in LTE
SDN is intended to be included for 5G LTE. According to IMT-2020 [7], testing for SDN
in 5G has begun during 2016. The telecommunications industry has already begun incorporating
and testing 5G LTE [8].
SDN can be integrated into the LTE architecture by replacing the serving gateway and
packet data network gateway with a controller. An example is shown in figure 4. Through this
architecture two types of data planes are created. The first data plane is incorporated in switches.
These switches connect the EPC components. The second data plane is incorporated in the
eNodeBs. The controller would handle the flow from user equipment to other user equipment or
to the Internet. It would accomplish this feat by orchestrating the data between eNodeBs and
switches.

Figure 4: SDN in LTE Architecture

2.5 Failure Types
Controller failure can occur from software, network, or hardware failures [9]. During
controller failure each node will maintain its current status but not be able to adjust flow control,
management of services, or take on new connections until a new controller is adopted.
Software failure can transpire through maintenance issues, bugs, or attacks. Maintenance
issues typically occur while software is either being updated or restarted. Software will freeze
and be unable to complete tasks. Software bugs can be introduced to a system while testing or
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going live. Since controllers manage nodes, they are a target for hackers. Malicious software can
be installed to take down or control the SDN controllers.
Network failure transpires through lack of connectivity. This issue occurs when the
controller and the node cannot communicate properly with one another. Connectivity can be a
physical issue or software issue.
Hardware failures happen from lack of maintenance or power. Hardware devices need to
be monitored for dust and insects. Insects can cause shorting of integrated circuits. High levels of
dust will insulate hardware components and can overheat components. Power failure happens
when there are issues powering the hardware.

2.6 Failure Detection
Failure detection is important in determining controller failure. Often controllers do not
fail. Instead they provide false positives that a failure has occurred. Often failure detection has a
high mistake rate [10]. Detection of failure can be discovered in a plethora of ways including
heartbeat messages and failure messages.
Failure messages are a graceful way for controllers to fail. If a controller is shutdown due
to maintenance, it can send failure messages to nearby neighbors informing them of its status.
Heartbeat messages are a way for neighboring controllers to determine if a controller is
alive. Each controller periodically sends messages to nearby neighbors announcing their
existence. Reverse heartbeat messages are another way of failure detection. With reverse
heartbeat messages, nodes message controllers periodically to determine if the controller is alive.
In either case if messages are not received within a certain time frame controllers are assumed to
have failed.
With heartbeat messages the issue of false positives occurs. False positives emerge when
heartbeat messages happen but are missed by neighboring controllers. Neighboring controllers
then try to adopt nodes still associated with the connected controller.
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3 Related Work
Failover for distributed controllers is an important issue that must be addressed in order
for SDN to provide ubiquitous connectivity. Distributed SDN controller failure can occur for a
plethora of industries. These industries include: Wide Area Networks, telecommunications, data
centers, and big data. Each area has its own constraints thus will require its own set of failover
mechanisms.
Failover for SDN has been researched topic. Mathis Obadia et al. [9] explored a greedy
mechanism for failover. They implemented failover for distributed SDN controllers. Their
simulation involved Mininet with Floodlight controllers. They developed a proactive approach to
the greedy mechanism to enhance the speed of recovery.
Li et al [11] proposed a proactive recovery mechanism based on controller load and
switch-controller delay. In their mechanism they use scores to reassign switch paths during
failover.
A fast and load-aware controller failover mechanism was analyzed by Fang, Wang, and
Wang [12]. They proposed an enhanced algorithm to Li et al [11] where controllers pre-compute
a recovery plan for failure of other controllers. Their algorithm derives a recovery plan based on
switch-controller delay from their mapping in addition to the standard deviation of the controller
load.
Failover with redundant controllers has been researched by Pashkov et al [13]. They
developed a failover mechanism that incorporates various standby strategies for the redundant
controllers. These methods include hot, warm, and cold standby. They proved their hot and warm
mechanisms to be effective for failover with relatively low overhead.
Borokhovich and S. Schmid [14] explored failover on OpenFlow switches. They
analyzed local fast failover due to link failures. They presented a randomized deterministic
algorithm for forwarding sets to show that local fast failover is efficient under randomized link
failures.
A method to solve control plane link failures for a single controller was proposed by
Beheshti and Y. Zhang [15]. They proposed an algorithm to determine the optimal placement of
the controller to maximize resiliency. This allows the network to react to switch and link failures
in the data plane by re-routing control traffic.

3.1 Redundant Controller Strategies
Recovery mechanisms can be incorporated through redundant controllers. The redundant
controller architecture incorporates two or more controllers per controller domain. The first
controller will actively control the domain while the other controller(s) remain in a standby
mode. In case of failure, the standby controller will replace the active controller. Standby
controllers duplicate active controllers in all functionality. Redundant controller strategies
provide a fast failover technique. Redundant controllers can be used when extra hardware and
software is available and recovery time is crucial. Big data for real-time analytics is a prime
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candidate for redundant controllers. Three strategies for controller redundancy include cold
standby, warm standby, and hot standby [13].

3.1.1 Cold Standby
In the cold standby strategy, the standby controller is stateless. During failure of the
active controller, the standby controller will become active and take over the failed controller’s
domain without any knowledge of the network configuration. It will initialize its default
configuration of services and applications before starting its topology discovery. In this strategy
the standby controller remains unloaded until active. This strategy is ideal for stateless services
and applications.

3.1.2 Hot Standby
In the hot standby strategy, the active controller is duplicated by the standby controller
for all changes that occurs. This duplication runs a full state synchronization. When the active
controller fails, the standby controller can replace its position in the current state. This minimizes
the recovery time, yet it will require implementing software and hardware redundancy in
addition to high communication overhead.

3.1.3 Warm Standby
In the warm standby strategy, the standby controller periodically runs a full state
synchronization of the active controller to retain its state. During failure of the active controller,
the standby controller will operate based on the last state synchronization. With this strategy
some states will be lost and some services will be interrupted. This cost will reduce the overhead
in communication. It will also eliminate full initialization.

3.2 Non-Redundant Controller Strategies
In most cases redundant controllers are unnecessary. They create overhead by requiring
software and hardware redundancies as well as additional communication. In non-redundant
controller strategies, there is only one controller per controller domain. During failure,
controllers can increase their domain and adopt orphan nodes in their network. This reduces the
overhead of the network. Non-redundant controller strategies can be effective in data centers or
telecommunications. Two current strategies for non-redundant controllers include least loaded
failover and greedy failover. A new failover proposed by this paper includes HLF.

3.2.1 Greedy Failover
In the greedy failover, controllers try to adopt orphan nodes at the edge of their domain.
Greedy failover can be implemented reactively. First, detection of controller failure is conducted
by the nodes. They transmit reverse heartbeat messages to their controllers to determine the
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status of their controller. If the controller fails to respond to a number of messages, failure is
detected and the nodes become orphan nodes.
Orphan nodes must then search for a new controller. They send out discovery messages
to their connected nodes. The nodes in close proximity forward the discovery message to their
controllers. If the nodes in close proximity do not have a controller they will drop the message.
The first controller to connect with the orphan node will adopt it. Flow tables contained in the
orphan node will remain unchanged until the controller has ample time to discover the topology
of its new domain. Once a controller adopts one orphan node it must update its database with
information from the node. This must be completed before discovering more orphan nodes. The
algorithm for the reactive greedy method is shown in Algorithm1.
Algorithm1: Reactive Greedy
1. listenForMessages
2. if receiveMessage then
3. if hasController = false then
4.
linkCapacity = getLink
5.
hops = getHops
6.
adoptController
7.
hasController = true
8. end if
9. end if
Greedy failover can also be implemented in a proactive approach. In this approach,
controllers take turns exchanging their network information with the nodes. This occurs when the
nodes are powered up. The nodes use the greedy algorithm during their initialization setup to
pre-determine which controllers to connect to in case of failure. The nodes then insert this
information into their database. The algorithm for this has been developed by Mathis Obadia et
al [9] and completed using the algorithm2.
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Algorithm2: Proactive Greedy [9]
1. while setOfNodes 0 do
2. for neighborDomain setOfDomains do
3.
if ∃ node setOfNodes then
4.
Add node to setOfNeighborDomainBackupNodes
5.
Remove node from setOfNodes
6.
end if
7. end for
8. if neighborDomain setOfDomains node setOfNodes then
9.
Add first node setOfNodes to first setOfNeighborDomainBackupNodes
10. Remove node from setOfNodes
11. end if
12. end while
Detection of controller failure is established the same way as the reactive method above.
Once failure is determined, orphan nodes contact controllers in their database. The controllers
then establish connections to all orphan nodes simultaneously. Then the controllers updated its
database with information from the newly adopted nodes simultaneously.

3.2.2 Least Loaded Failover
Least loaded failover [12] is a simple recovery mechanism that is efficient in data centers
where controllers are often physically located next to each other. During controller failover, the
least loaded controllers increase their controller domain by adopting the orphan nodes.
Detection of controller failure is conducted by heartbeat messages. Controllers interact
with each other to determine their nodes. Afterwards they monitor each other through heartbeat
messages. When messages fail between controllers, failure is detected. The controllers then
determine the least loaded controller. This controller will then adopt all the orphan nodes
simultaneously. Flow tables contained in the newly adopted nodes will remain unchanged until
the controller can discover the new topology.
Least loaded failover can be combined with greedy failover. This mechanism has been
proposed by Li et al. [11]. In this mechanism, scores are created based on controller loading and
switch-controller delay. The scores determine how the nodes should be reassigned to controllers
during failover.

3.2.3 Proposed Hop and Link Failover
HLF is a mechanism proposed by this paper. It takes a different approach to failover for
distributed controllers. It incorporates the adoption of orphan nodes based on the physical
number of hops from controllers as well as the link capacity from the controller to the nodes.
The previous failover methods are intended for SDN in data centers. They assume
controllers and nodes are in close proximity to one another. HLF is intended to provide efficient
- 10 -

and quick response for distributed controllers when controllers are not the physical located near
each other. HLF would guarantee nodes to be within the least amount of hops to their controllers
with the greatest amount of link capacity. HLF can be incorporated either reactively or
proactively. This recovery mechanism can be implemented for a telecommunications network.
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4 Proposed Hop and Link Failover Algorithm
HLF is proposed to combat controller failure when controllers are not physically located
to each other. The approach of HLF takes into account the heterogeneity of network connections.
Controllers adopt orphan nodes based on the number of hops from the nodes to the controller as
well as the link capacity between the nodes. HLF organizes controller domains initially based on
the number of hops leading to the controller. If the number of hops is equivalent to another
controller, the link connection between the controllers is compared.
HLF is implemented using three algorithms. The first algorithm is for failure detection of
the node, the second and third algorithms are for controller adoption. Failure detection is
implemented through reverse heartbeat messages. Each node is responsible for sending messages
to confirm the controller status. Failure is determined when messages are not received. Failure
detection is implemented for each node in the following steps and algorithm3:
Step 1.
Step 2.
Step 3.
Step 4.

A node sends a heartbeat message to its controller every five seconds.
The node listens for a reply message from the controller. The timestamp from the last
reply message is stored by the node.
If the node does not receive a reply message from their controller within thirty
seconds it deems the controller failed [16].
The node becomes an orphan and broadcasts discovery messages to its neighbor
nodes.

Algorithm3: Failure Detection (Node)
1. while hasController = true
2. listenForMessages
3. if currentTime – lastSentMessage >= 5 seconds then
4.
sendHeartBeat
5. end if
6. if currentTime – lastReceivedMessage >= 30 seconds then
7.
hasController = false
8. end if
9. end while
10. broadcastOrphan(neighborNodes)
Controller adoption occurs when a controller receives a discovery message and tries to
connect to the orphan node. The first controller to interact with the orphan node adopts the node.
After the adoption, other controllers can also message the newly adopted node. The node will
determine if it requires fewer hops than other controllers or is equal distance with more link
capacity. If a controller exemplifies these metrics, it will replace the existing controller. Once a
controller adopts a node it will then update its database with information from the node.
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Controller adoption is implemented in the following steps and algorithms. Algorithm4 is from
the controller’s perspective while algorithm5 is from the node’s perspective.
Controller:
Step 1.
A controller receives a discovery message.
Step 2.
The controller creates an adoption message with the hops and link capacity to the
orphan node.
Step 3.
The controller sends the message to the node.
Algorithm4: Controller Adoption (Controller)
1. listenForMessages
2. if receiveMessage then
3. linkCapacity = getLink
4. hops = getHops
5. sendAdoptionMessage(linkCapacity, hops)
6. end if
Node:
Step 1.
Step 2.
Step 3.
Step 4.

The node receives an adoption message from controller1.
The node accepts the adoption.
The node receives an adoption message from controller2.
The node evaluates the connection to controller1 versus the connection to controller2.
It takes the connection with the least amount of hops and bandwidth.

Algorithm5: Controller Adoption (Node)
1. listenForMessages
2. if receiveMessage then
3. if hasController = false then
4.
linkCapacity = getLink
5.
hops = getHops
6.
adoptController
7.
hasController = true
8. else if hasController = true then
9.
newLinkCapacity = getLink
10. newHops = getHops
11. if hops newHops or (hops newHops and linkCapacity < newLinkCapacity) then
12.
dropCurrentController
13.
linkCapacity = newLinkCapacity
14.
hops = newHops
15.
adoptController
16. end if
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17. end if
18. end if
An example of HLF is shown in a reactive approach through figures 5 through 8. Figure
5 shows the architecture of three domains. Each domain consists of one controller and three
nodes. The connection between each node varies.

Figure 5: HLF Example Architecture

Reverse heartbeat messages are sent from the nodes to the controller. If controller1 fails
the nodes in its domain will announce their orphan status through discovery messages to
neighboring nodes. Node3 will send messages to node2, node4, and node5 as shown in figure 6.
Since node2 is the only node connected to a controller it will forward the message from node3 to
its controller through node1.

Figure 6: Node3 Orphan Broadcast
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Controller0 will reply to the orphan message to adopt node3. It will send an adoption
message through node1 and node2. When the message reaches node3, node3 will accept the
adoption from controller0 (Figure 7) with three hops and a link connection of 50 megabits per
second (Mbps). Node3 will then send data to controller0 for it to update its database.

Figure 7: Node3 Adoption

Node5 will concurrently go through the same process as node3 and be adopted by
controller2. Controller2 will notify node5 that it is three hops away with a link connection of 70
Mbps. Node4 broadcasts messages to node3 and node5. They forward their messages to their
controllers. Node4 can be adopted by controller2 due to the latency of the messages. Controller2
will inform node4 that is it is four hops away with a link connection of 30 Mbps. Node4 will then
receive an adoption message from controller0 with four hops and link connection of 40 Mbps.
Node4 will then upgrade to controller0. The final architecture for failover is shown in figure 8.

Figure 8: Final Architecture

HLF can be implemented proactively. In the proactive approach, each node predetermines their backup controller. This process is completed prior to controller failure. During
- 15 -

backup controller selection, the first controller to contact the node is initially the backup
controller. Other controllers can replace the backup controller’s position if it requires less hops
or equal with a higher link capacity.
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5 Performance Evaluation
HLF can be implemented in any distributed SDN architecture however it is most
effective when controller locations are not be physically located nearby. To simulate this, HLF
was integrated in a 5G LTE architecture. In this architecture a set number of eNodeBs were used
to show temporary failover. The LTE architecture was simulated with the assumption that
controllers will reside relatively near their controller domain but may not reside in the same data
center as each other.

5.1 Implementation and Setup
To evaluate HLF, four failover mechanisms were simulated. The four simulations include
HLF as a reactive mechanism, HLF as a proactive mechanism, greedy failover as a reactive
mechanism, and greedy failover as a proactive mechanism. These simulations were developed
for 5G telecommunications thus all controllers were positioned in different locations. The
simulations consisted of two different architectures.
The first failover architecture consists of three controllers and sixteen eNodeBs as shown
in figure 9. In this simulation controller1 fails. Controller0 and controller2 must adopt orphan
eNodeB5 through eNodeB10.

Figure 9: Failover Architecture1

The second failover architecture consists of three controllers and nine eNodeBs as shown
in figure 10. In this simulation controller1 fails. Controller0 and controller2 must adopt orphan
eNodeB3, eNodeB4, and eNodeB5.
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Figure 10: Failover Architecture2

Each simulation began with the initialization of the architecture. Next, controller1 would
fail and failover procedures would begin. The orphan eNodeBs would broadcast orphan
messages to nearby neighbors. To include latency of network delay with the messages, a variable
sleep time was randomly created for both the controllers and eNodeBs. The network delay was
determined after analysis of queuing delay, processing delay, propagation delay, and
transmission delay.
Queuing delay was determined for the maximum network traffic load of 25%, 50%, 75%,
and 95%. These loads were evaluated with a maximum queue of 512 packets [20] per node or
controller. With a message size of 750 bytes and rate of transmission of 175 Mbps, one packet
was calculated to take 0.034 ms. At a maximum traffic load of 25%, the maximum queuing delay
was 4 ms. At 50%, the delay was 9 ms. For 75% the delay was 13 ms and 95% load was 17 ms.
Processing delay was assumed to be the same for every component thus neglected from
the simulations.
Propagation delay was calculated by the distance between two eNodeBs divided by the
speed of light. The maximum distance for an eNodeB is 32 kilometers [17]. With this distance,
the maximum propagation delay is 0.1 milliseconds (ms). Since this number is insignificant,
propagation delay was assumed to be negligible.
Transmission delay was calculated by the number of bits in a message divided by the rate
of transmission. The message size was determined based on the size of a packet used in
videotelephony [19]. This packet was 750 bytes. Rate of transmission was deducted based on the
link capacity of a macrocell. A macrocell has a link capacity of approximately 175 megabits per
second [18], however path loss will reduce the link connection. The minimum rate of
transmission used was 50 megabits per second. Using these assumptions, the transmission delay
calculates to 0.1 ms and is considered negligible.
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For all failover mechanisms four simulation load variations were created. The simulations
incorporated delay between 0 to 4 ms for 25% load, 0 to 9 ms for 50% load, 0 to 13 ms for 75%
load, and 0 to 17 ms for 95% load.
For all simulations, each controller was initialized to each eNodeB prior to starting the
simulation. For the proactive mechanisms, the eNodeBs begin contacting controllers to
determine their backup controller during initialization.

5.2 Results and Analysis
Each simulation varied due to the queuing delay time that was randomly generated for
each eNodeB and controller. To combat any potential bias in these simulations, each failover
mechanism ran twenty five simulations. For each failover mechanism there were five
evaluations. These evaluations included eNodeB hops, link capacity, controller load, network
recovery time, and controller traffic on the network. Each evaluation was completed for 25%,
50%, 75%, and 95% uniform data traffic as well as non-uniform data traffic.

5.2.1 First Failover Architecture
The first architecture (figure 11a) was simulated in both the greedy and HLF
mechanisms. This architecture reflects a general design for a telecommunications network.
During these simulations the HLF mechanisms maintained the same architecture in every
simulation regardless of the data traffic (figure 11b). The greedy mechanisms provided a
variation of architectures. The least advantageous architecture was created by the greedy
mechanisms. It occurred during the non-uniform data traffic. During this simulation the
controller0 adopted all orphan eNodeBs (figure 11c).

Figure 11a: Starting Architecture1
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Figure 11b: HLF Resulting Architecture1

Figure 11c: Greedy Resulting Architecture1

5.2.1.1 eNodeB Hops
In order to increase the speed of transmission, the reduction of hops to a destination is
necessary. Reducing the amount of hops reduces the amount of queues the message must sit in as
well as the reduction in the processing delay per eNodeB. This metric was evaluated by
analyzing the resulting architecture for each simulation.
Figure 12a shows the analysis of the simulation for architecture1. It shows the average
number of hops from the eNodeBs to the controllers including the maximum and minimum
number of hops in uniform data traffic. Figure 12b displays the average number of hops from the
eNodeBs to the controllers including the maximum and minimum number of hops for 50% and
95% uniform data traffic. The results show that HLF always maintained two hops from the
controller to all the orphan eNodeBs.
- 20 -

The greedy failover exhibited a variety of architectures except for the reactive greedy
mechanism with 25% uniform data traffic. The variation in the architecture was due to the
incorporation of delay. Delay was a factor in the response time for both eNodeBs and controllers
in the greedy mechanism. It allowed controllers to adopt eNodeBs that were closer to other
controllers. The reactive greedy mechanism with 25% load is believed to have remained constant
due to the low amount of delay. The results show the greedy failover mechanisms adopting
orphan eNodeBs with an average between 2 and 2.12 hops.
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Figure 12a: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 for all Uniform Data
Traffic
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Figure 12b: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 for 50% and 95% Uniform
Data Traffic
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The first architecture was additionally simulated with non-uniform data traffic to increase
the visibility of the issue of the greedy algorithm with regards to hops. The data traffic was nonuniform thus that the controller domain under controller2 maintained a 95% load while the rest
of the system maintained a 25% load. Figure 13 shows the results of an instance that had
occurred. During this instance controller0 adopted all the orphan eNodeBs in the greedy
mechanism. It increased the amount of hops to the controller for eNodeB7 to eNodeB10. In the
HLF mechanism, 2 hops were maintained for all orphan eNodeBs.
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Figure 13: eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 in Non-Uniform Data Traffic

Figure 11c shows the configuration that occurred when using the greedy mechanisms for
the non-uniform data traffic. The figure shows a skewed architecture in which controller0
adopted all orphan eNodeBs. ENodeB7 through eNodeB10 required less hops to controller2,
however were not able to be adopted due to the latency of controller2. The latency of controller2
could be temporary yet cause an inefficient ending architecture.
The HLF mechanisms showed an evenly distributed ending architecture for failover
(figure 11b). During failover it was possible for controller0 to initially adopt all orphan eNodeBs,
however controller2 was able to re-adopt eNodeB7 through eNodeB10 to enable a more
balanced architecture. This resulted with each orphan eNodeB having 2 hops to its new
controller.
With regards to the amount of hops between the orphan eNodeBs and the controllers, the
greedy mechanisms make no guarantees. The possibility of an inefficient resulting architecture
can occur. HLF displays a better ending architecture for failover. It enables eNodeBs to be
adopted by the controller with the least amount of hops.
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5.2.1.2 Link Capacity

Link Capacity (Megabits per second)

To avoid network latency, the connection from a controller to an eNodeB must be as
efficient as possible. Therefore orphan eNodeBs should be adopted with the highest available
link connection. Figure 14a shows the results of the average, maximum, and minimum link
connection from the orphan eNodeBs to the controllers for all uniform data traffic. Figure 14b
shows the results of the average, maximum, and minimum link connection from the orphan
eNodeBs to the controllers for 50% and 95% uniform data traffic. The greedy mechanisms
showed a variation in the link connection per eNodeBs with exception of the reactive greedy
mechanism with 25% traffic load. The HLF mechanism maintained the maximum possible link
connection during every simulation.
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Figure 14a: Average Link Connection for Architecture1 for all Uniform Data Traffic
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Link Connection (Megabits per second)

160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
eNodeB5
Greedy R50

eNodeB6

Greedy P50

eNodeB7

Greedy R95

eNodeB8

Greedy P95

HLF R50

eNodeB9
HLF P50

HLF R95

eNodeB10
HLF P95

Figure 14b: Average Link Connection for Architecture1 for 50% and 95% Uniform Data Traffic

With non-uniform data traffic the results produced a lower link connection for the greedy
algorithm while HLF maintained the maximum possible link connection with the least amount of
hops (figure 11c, 15). The resulting architecture for the greedy mechanisms produced 100 Mbps
link connection for all orphan eNodeBs. The resulting architecture for the HLF mechanisms
produced 100 Mbps for eNodeB5 and eNodeB6 and 150 Mbps for eNodeB7 and eNodeB10.
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Figure 15: Link Connection for Architecture1 in Non-uniform Data traffic
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eNodeB10

The results for this architecture show that HLF always provides the ability for the highest
link capacity from an eNodeB to its closest controller. The greedy algorithm does not ensure the
maximum link connection for failover.
5.2.1.3 Controller Load

Average Number of eNodeBs

One measure of controller effectiveness can be correlated to the amount of load a
controller has. The more eNodeBs communicating with a controller, the more traffic there is in
that controller domain. A controller with higher traffic must have the capacity to handle it.
Controller load for the architecture1 is shown on figure 16. These results display the average
amount of eNodeBs per controller in addition to the maximum and minimum eNodeBs per
controller with uniform data traffic.
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Figure 16: Average Controller Load for Architecture1

On average all mechanisms performed in a similar manner, however the results show that
the architecture for the greedy mechanisms varied in all cases except for the reactive greedy
mechanism with 25% load. The HLF architecture did not vary. It maintained the same
architecture every time. The results show controller0 adopted two eNodeBs in addition to its own
eNodeBs and controller2 adopted four eNodeBs in addition to its own eNodeBs. While this
architecture is not evenly distributed, it does not overload one controller.
With uniform data traffic the greedy mechanisms showed variation in the amount of
eNodeBs adopted per controller. Controller0 adopted between zero to four eNodeBs while
controller2 adopted between two to six eNodeBs. This variation was dependent on the network
delay. With less delay a controller was able to obtain more eNodeBs. This allowed controllers
with less link connection to adopt eNodeBs. In a few simulations controller2 took the entire load
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of the controller1 and adopted all the orphan eNodeBs. With non-uniform data traffic, the reverse
occurred where controller0 adopted all orphan eNodeBs. This additional load is unnecessary for
one controller to solely bear when another controller has the available capacity.
With a non-uniform traffic load, controller0 adopted all the orphan eNodeBs in the
greedy algorithm (figure #). This result was due to the latency of controller2. With HLF it
maintained the same architecture as above.
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Figure #: Controller Load Non-Uniform Traffic

For controller loading, the greedy mechanism showed a potential to create the most
evenly distributed architecture, however not on a consistent basis. It also showed the potential to
overload a controller. With HLF there was a consistent architecture. For this reason, HLF is a
superior mechanism.
5.2.1.4 Network Recovery Time
The impact of failover can be evaluated through network recovery time. This metric is an
evaluation of the recovery from the point at which a controller fails to the point at which all
eNodeBs have been adopted in a final architecture. In this simulation, the recovery time was
calculated from failure of the controller1 to the recovery of the last orphan eNodeB.
Figure 17 displays the results of the average network recovery time in addition to the
maximum and minimum recovery time with uniform data traffic. The reactive greedy time
proved to be the fastest recovery time while the proactive HLF took the slowest time to recover.
Reactive HLF is shown to have a slower recovery time than the reactive greedy mechanism. This
is because HLF first runs the reactive greedy mechanism then accepts upgrades to other
controllers that incorporate decreased hops or the same hops with increased link capacity. It
should be noted that eNodeBs initially recover at the speed of the reactive greedy mechanism but
total recovery time is increased due to the upgrades. For this architecture, the proactive
mechanisms proved to be slower on average to its counterparts. The reason for this is due to the
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structure of the architecture as well as how the proactive mechanism works. The benefit of the
proactive mechanism is that orphan eNodeBs can be adopted when all the surrounding eNodeBs
are in its controller domain. With this first architecture the orphan eNodeBs always have an
immediate eNodeB in another domain. The proactive mechanism requires more overhead to
operate. It must maintain both a controller and backup controller. This additional overhead
creates additional processing time.
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Figure 17: Average Network Recovery Time for Architecture1

For this architecture, the reactive greedy mechanism proves to provide the fastest
failover. All other mechanisms have additional overhead which relays to added latency.

5.2.2 Second Failover Architecture
Architecture2 (figure 18a) was simulated in both the greedy and HLF mechanisms. This
architecture reflects a specific design potentially for rural areas. In rural areas it is expected that
mesh networks may not be cost effective as towns are established around nature’s topology.
ENodeBs may be built following rivers or streams. During these simulations the HLF
mechanisms maintained the same architecture in every simulation regardless of the data traffic
(figure 18b). The greedy mechanisms resulted in a variation of architectures. The least
advantageous architecture occurred when controller2 adopted all orphan eNodeBs (figure 18c).
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Figure 18a: Starting Architecture2

Figure 18b: HBF Resulting Architecture2
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Figure 18c: Greedy Resulting Architecture2

5.2.2.1 eNodeB Hops
The results of the second architecture’s simulation for all uniform data traffic are shown
in figure 19a. The results display an even amount of hops regardless of the algorithm. This is due
to the architecture in which both controller0 and controller2 have an equal number of hops to
each orphan node. Since the number of hops is equivalent, HLF does not provide any advantage
to the greedy algorithm for this metric. Figure 19b displays the average hops for 50% and 95%
data traffic per eNodeB.
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Figure 19a: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture2 for all Uniform Data
Traffic
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Figure 19b: Average Number of eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture1 for 50% and 95% Uniform
Data Traffic
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This architecture was also simulated with non-uniform data traffic. In this simulation
controller0’s domain operated with a 95% data traffic while the rest of the network operated at
25% data traffic. In this simulation there was no difference in regards to the number of hops
(figure 20).
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Figure 20: eNodeB Hops to Controller for Architecture2 in Non-Uniform Data Traffic

5.2.2.2 Link Capacity
The results of the average link connection for all uniform data traffic are shown in figure
21a. Figure 21b shows the average link connection for 50% and 95% uniform data traffic. The
greedy mechanisms displayed inconsistent failover architectures. In some simulations controller0
adopted all orphan eNodeBs while in other simulations controller2 adopted all of them. The
results show the average link connection was less than the maximum available link connection.
The HLF mechanisms did not show a variation. HLF ensured that in the final failover
architecture controller0 adopted the orphan eNodeBs 100% of the time. The results prove to
enable the maximum link capacity for all orphan eNodeBs.
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Figure 21a: Average Link Connection for Architecture2 for all Uniform Data Traffic
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Figure 21b: Average Link Connection for Architecture2 for 50% and 95% Uniform Data Traffic

This architecture was also simulated with non-uniform data traffic as described in the
eNodeB Hops section. Figure 22 shows the results of this simulation. The greedy mechanisms
adopted the lowest available link connection while HLF adopted the highest available link
connection. For the greedy mechanisms all orphan eNodeBs adopted a link connection of 75
Mbps. In HLF eNodeB3 was adopted with a link connection of 80 Mbps while eNodeB4 and
eNodeB5 adopted a link connection of 100 Mbps.
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Figure 22: Link Connection for Architecture2 in a Non-Uniform Data traffic

The results for this architecture show that HLF provides the highest link capacity from all
the connections to the controllers. The greedy mechanism cannot be trusted to provide the
maximum link capacity during failover.
5.2.2.3 Controller Load
Controller load varied with the greedy mechanisms for all instances of uniform data
traffic (figure 23). The HLF mechanisms did not vary the controller load. It maintained the same
architecture every time. With HLF the results showed controller0 adopted 3 eNodeBs in addition
to its own eNodeBs and controller2 did not adopt any eNodeBs.
With the greedy mechanisms, the amount of eNodeBs adopted per controller varied from
0 to 3 for controller0 and from 0 to 3 for controller2. This variation was dependent on the
network delay.
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Figure 23: Average Controller Load for Architecture2

For non-uniform loads, the HLF mechanism resulted with controller0 adopting 3
eNodeBs in addition to its own eNodeBs and controller2 did not adopting any. With the greedy
mechanism, the opposite occurred where controller2 adopted 3 eNodeBs and controller0 did not
adopt any.
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In this architecture controller loading is maintained regardless of the mechanism. One
controller will always adopt all orphan eNodeBs. This is due to the how both mechanisms
operate.
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5.2.2.4 Network Recovery Time
Network recovery time for uniform data traffic is shown in figure 24. The proactive
greedy mechanism shows the fastest average network recovery times. The slowest average
recovery time is from the HLF reactive mechanism. The proactive mechanisms prove to be faster
due to its nature. In the proactive mechanisms, the eNodeBs have a known backup location to
another controller. They message the controller for adoption immediately after failure. This
behavior allows a fairly linear recovery time regardless of the number of orphan eNodeBs [9].
With the reactive greedy mechanism, the recovery time correlates to number of orphan
eNodeBs. This behavior is to be expected as the eNodeBs in the reactive mechanism can only
message controllers once their neighbor has is in a different domain. The reactive HLF
mechanism takes the longest average recovery time for the final failover architecture. As
explained for the first architecture this is due to the fact that it runs the greedy mechanism then
potentially upgrades.
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Figure 24: Average Network Recovery Time for Architecture2

For this architecture the proactive mechanisms are the faster mechanisms for failover.
The speed at which failover can occur in a proactive mechanism is not dependent on the amount
of eNodeBs but the number of hops from an orphan eNodeB to another domain. The greater the
number of hops are the faster the proactive mechanisms will recovery when compared to the
reactive mechanisms.

5.2.3 Control Traffic
Control traffic is a part of network traffic and is defined as the amount of control data
transferred between the eNodeBs and the controllers. For theses simulations the control traffic
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did not vary by the greedy mechanism or HLF mechanism. Control traffic was affected varying
on whether the mechanism was reactive or proactive.
Failover mechanisms require heartbeat messages. These messages increase the control
traffic on each component in the network. Increased messages correlate to an increase in network
delay. In the simulations the reactive mechanisms increased the data traffic by sending reverse
heartbeat messages from the eNodeBs to its prospective controller. The proactive mechanisms
required additional messaging by sending reverse heartbeat messages to both its controller and
backup controller. This doubled the amount of required messaging and increased the network
delay.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
As SDN is being commercialized for networking, it becomes apparent that failover
strategies are needed to remove the issue of a single point of failure and maintain seamless
connectivity for users. There are a plethora of failover strategies available. Each mechanism has
its own advantages that should be analyzed prior to implementation.
This paper has shown the capabilities of the HLF mechanism to handle failover when
controllers are setup in a distributed architecture and controller locations not located in the same
location. HLF is a non-redundant controller strategy that can be incorporated in a reactive or
proactive mechanism. It proves to be an advantageous mechanism that provides failover for
nodes with the least amount of hops and the highest link capacity. It addresses the randomness of
the greedy algorithm for node adoption.
Future work will include a weighted algorithm for dynamic adjustment for heterogeneous
networks. This mechanism will consider network resources such as controller load, capacity, and
bandwidth. This direction will be investigated to further tune failover procedures for distributed
controllers.
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